ABSTRACT Cancelable biometric schemes have been widely studied to protect templates in biometric authentication over networks. These schemes transform biometric features and perform pattern matching without restoring the original features. Although they strongly prevent the leakage of the original features, the response time can be very long in a large-scale biometric identification system. Most of the existing indexing schemes cannot be used to speed up the biometric identification system over networks since a biometric index leaks some information about the original feature. Secure and efficient indexing is a major challenge in large-scale biometric identification over networks. In this paper, we propose a novel indexing scheme that is promising with regard to both security and efficiency. The proposed indexing scheme transforms a permutation-based index, which is the state-of-the-art index in the field of similarity search, and performs a query search without recovering the original index. We also propose a method to artificially generate biometric features necessary to generate an index (which are called ''pivots'') based on GANs (Generative Adversarial Networks). We prove that the transformed index leaks no information about the original index and the original biometric feature (i.e., perfect secrecy), and comprehensively show that the proposed indexing scheme has the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability. We then demonstrate that the proposed indexing scheme significantly outperforms the existing indexing schemes using three real datasets (face, fingerprint, and finger-vein datasets), and is very promising with respect to the accuracy and response time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric authentication has been widely used for many applications such as computer login, banking, time and attendance management, and physical access control. It is also expected that biometric authentication is used for applications over networks such as internet banking, access control over networks, membership authentication for members-only websites, and online payment through POS (Point of Sales) terminals. In such applications, a client sends a biometric sample (referred to as a query sample) to a server for authentication. Then the server compares the query sample with a biometric feature (referred as a template) enrolled in the database, and computes a score (similarity or distance) between them to authenticate a user.
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Although biometric authentication over networks has several potential applications, it raises serious security and privacy concerns. Specifically, since biometric traits (e.g., fingerprint, finger-vein, iris) are not unchangeable, biometric features cannot be revoked unlike passwords or smart cards once they are leaked from the server. In addition, biometric traits are highly sensitive information that could reveal pathological medical conditions [1] . A naive approach to preventing the leakage of biometric features is to encrypt the features using an encryption scheme such as AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). However, this approach needs to decrypt the encrypted features at the matching phase. Thus, a skilled attacker who aims at the time of decryption can obtain the original features. In addition, the original features can be leaked from the server by internal fraud, since the server can decrypt the original features for pattern matching.
Cancelable biometric schemes (also called feature transformation) [2] - [10] have been studied to address this issue (surveys of template protection can be found in [11] , [12] ). These schemes transform a biometric feature so that the original feature is not recovered from the transformed feature. Then they perform pattern matching without restoring the original feature. For example, CIRF (Correlation Invariant Random Filtering) [3] - [5] transforms a biometric feature by the 2D NTT (Number Theoretic Transform) and random filtering. Then it performs pattern matching by multiplying two transformed features and the 2D inverse NTT. In the field of cryptography, it is said that a cryptosystem has perfect secrecy if any ciphertext c ∈ C (C: ciphertext space) provides no information about the plaintext a ∈ A (A: plaintext space); i.e., Pr(a|c) = Pr(a) for any a ∈ A and any c ∈ C [13] . Similarly, the transformed template t ∈ T (T : space of transformed features) in CIRF provides no information about the original template x ∈ X (X : space of original features); i.e., Pr(x|t) = Pr(x) for any x ∈ X and any t ∈ T [3]- [5] .
While some cancelable biometric schemes strongly prevent the leakage of the original features, there is a major challenge with regard to response time in a large-scale biometric identification system. To explain this issue, we describe biometric verification and identification in detail. Specifically, biometric authentication can divided into the following two types: verification and identification [14] . In verification, a user claims her ID along with her query sample. Then the system decides whether the user is genuine by comparing the query sample with a template corresponding to the claimed ID. When the client is a personal computer owned by each user (e.g., smart phone, tablet PC), a user can implicitly claim her ID by sending a device ID such as IDFV (identifierForVendor) [15] and AdvertisingID [16] . However, when the client is a public computer (e.g., access control unit, time and attendance unit, kiosk terminal, school computer), a user needs to explicitly claim her ID by entering an ID number or presenting a smart card, which causes inconvenience to her.
Biometric identification is preferable in terms of convenience in such cases. In identification, a user does not claim her ID and presents only her query sample. Then the system decides who the user is by comparing the query sample with many templates in the database (i.e., one-to-many matching). Since the user needs not enter an ID number or present a smart card, biometric identification can provide a more convenient way of authentication. However, the one-to-many matching time increases in proportion to the number of templates n. For example, it takes about 20 seconds to compare a query sample with all templates in the database when we use CIRF [3] - [5] in a finger-vein identification system with n = 70000 templates (as described in Section IV).
Biometric indexing (or classification) schemes [17] - [30] have been widely studied to speed up biometric identification (surveys of them can be found in [17] , [18] ). These schemes generate, for each biometric feature, an index, which is a simple representation of the biometric feature (e.g., binary sequence, low dimensional vector). At the authentication phase, they typically compute an approximate score (similarity or distance) between a query sample and each template using the indexes. Then they sort the templates in descending (or ascending) order of approximate similarities (or distances), and compute an ''exact'' score according to the sorted order (e.g., if the exact distance falls below a pre-determined threshold, the system identifies the user as the corresponding enrollee; otherwise, it continues to the next template). Since the index is a simple representation of the biometric feature, the approximate score is efficiently computed and is highly correlated with the exact score. Thus, a genuine template can be found at the early stage of exact matching, and the one-tomany matching time can be significantly reduced.
However, the index leaks some information about the biometric feature, because it is a simple representation of the biometric feature. Thus, we need to protect the index in the same way as the biometric feature when we apply an indexing scheme to the biometric identification system over network. Below we briefly describe related work on this issue.
A. RELATED WORK
A number of indexing schemes have been proposed for biometric identification; e.g., fingerprint identification [19] - [22] , iris identification [23] - [26] , and finger-vein identification [27] - [30] . However, most of them do no protect an index and therefore cannot be used in conjunction with a cancelable biometric scheme.
A recent study [31] proposed a cancelable indexing scheme based on matrix factorization for finger-vein images. This scheme transforms an index so that the transformed index leaks no information about the original index and the original biometric feature (i.e., perfect secrecy). Then it performs a query search without recovering the original index. Although this scheme has the perfect secrecy property, it is not very efficient. Specifically, it requires the exact score computation for 57.6% (more than half) of the templates in the database to find a genuine template with probability 95% (i.e., hit rate = 95%), as shown in our experiments.
Other transformation (or encryption) based secure indexing (or filtering) schemes [32] - [37] have been proposed in the literature. Bringer et al. [32] proposed a filtering technique based on SMC (Secure Multiparty Computation) for biometric identification 1 . Hartloff et al. [33] proposed a fingerprint indexing scheme that combines geometric hashing with the fuzzy vault. Jin et al. [37] proposed a fingerprint cancelable indexing scheme called the ''index-of-max (IoM) hashing'' based on LSH (Locality Sensitive Hashing). The studies in [34] - [36] proposed a transformation (or encryption) based indexing scheme for secure similarity search. Kuzu et al. [34] proposed a secure LSH indexing scheme, which encrypts bucket identifiers and contents in LSH. Wang and Ravishankar [35] proposed an indexing scheme 1 In [32] , the original templates are stored in the server, and therefore can be leaked by internal fraud or illegal access. √ represents that the scheme has the perfect secrecy property. ''Identification time (hit rate = 95%)'' represents the time required to find a genuine template from n = 70000 finger-vein templates with probability 95% in our experiments. ''Average identification time'' represents the average time to find a genuine template from n = 70000 finger-vein templates.
called theR-tree, which transforms the R-tree via ASPE (Asymmetric Scalar-product Preserving Encryption).
Yiu et al. [36] proposed transformation-based metric indexing schemes. However, all of the indexing (or filtering) schemes in [32] - [37] do not have the perfect secrecy property explained above. In summary, secure and efficient indexing is still an open problem in large-scale biometric identification over networks.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we focus on a large-scale biometric identification system over networks with a public client (e.g., access control unit, time and attendance unit, kiosk terminal, school computer), and propose a novel indexing scheme that is promising with regard to both security and efficiency. Specifically, we focus on the permutation-based indexing scheme [38] , which is a state-of-the-art indexing scheme in the field of similarity search. The proposed scheme transforms a permutation-based index so that the transformed index leaks no information about the original index and the original biometric feature (i.e., perfect secrecy).
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a cancelable permutation-based indexing scheme, which transforms a permutation-based index and computes a distance between two transformed indexes without restoring the original indexes. We also propose a method to artificially generate pivots, which are biometric features necessary to generate an index, based on GANs (Generative Adversarial Networks) [39] , [40] . We prove that the proposed scheme has the perfect secrecy property, and comprehensively show that the proposed scheme has the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability [11] , [41] , which are desirable properties for cancelable biometrics (Section III).
• We show that the proposed scheme significantly outperforms the existing indexing schemes using three real datasets: face [42] , fingerprint [43] , and finger-vein [44] datasets. We show that in the finger-vein dataset, the cancelable indexing scheme in [31] requires about 11.3 seconds to find a genuine template from n = 70000 templates with probability 95% (i.e., hit rate = 95%), whereas the proposed indexing scheme requires only about 0.84 seconds to do so. We also show that the cancelable indexing scheme in [31] and the proposed scheme find a genuine template from n = 70000 templates in 2.39 and 0.63 seconds, respectively, on average without degrading the accuracy of the biometric identification system (Section IV). Table 1 summarizes the existing secure indexing (or filtering) schemes and the proposed indexing scheme.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we explain cancelable biometrics and the permutation-based indexing scheme. In Section III, we propose a cancelable permutation-based indexing scheme. We also prove that the proposed scheme has the perfect secrecy property, and thoroughly discuss its the security. In Section IV, we report our experimental results. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce the basic notations in this paper (Section II-A). Then we briefly explain cancelable biometrics (Sections II-B and II-C). We also describe threat models and desirable properties for cancelable biometrics (Section II-D). Finally we explain the permutation-based indexing scheme [38] (Section II-E).
A. NOTATIONS
Let R be the set of real numbers, and N be the set of natural numbers. Let X be the space of biometric features. In cancelable biometrics, the system transforms a biometric feature using a parameter, which plays a similar role to an encryption key (as described in Section II-B in detail). The transformed template and parameter are also called the PI (Pseudonymous Identifier) and AD (Auxiliary Data), respectively (see Table D .1 in [45] ). Let K be the space of parameters for biometric features, and T be the space of transformed features.
In this paper, we propose a cancelable indexing scheme that transforms an index, which is a simple representation of the biometric feature, in an analogous way to cancelable biometrics. Let P be the space of indexes, R be the space of parameters for indexes, and U be the space of transformed indexes. Let n ∈ N be the number of templates enrolled in the VOLUME 7, 2019 The notations in the first, second, third, and fourth groups are introduced  in Sections II-A, II-B, II-E, and III, respectively. database (we assume that each of n users enrols one template), and m ∈ N be the number of pivots, which are necessary to generate an index. Table 2 shows the notations used in this paper. The notations in the second, third, and fourth groups are related to cancelable biometrics, the permutation-based indexing scheme, and the proposed indexing scheme, respectively, which we introduce in Sections II-B, II-E, and III. Figure 1 shows the overview of cancelable biometric verification. Here we assume that the i-th user (1 ≤ i ≤ n) enrolls her template and then attempts authentication by presenting her ID along with her query sample.
B. CANCELABLE BIOMETRIC VERIFICATION
At the enrollment phase, a template x i ∈ X of the i-th user is transformed into t i ∈ T using the transformation function f k i : X → T that depends on the parameter k i ; i.e., t i = f k i (x i ). The parameter k i is randomly generated from K (k i is generally different from one template to another in verification), and is stored in a client, token of the i-th user, or a parameter management server [46] , which is administrated separately from the authentication server. The parameter management server model falls into a data separation model using multiple databases in ISO/IEC 30136 [41] . In Figure 1 , the parameter k i is stored in the client. In Appendix V, we explain the case where we use the parameter management server in detail. In both cases, the transformed template t i is stored in the database of the authentication server.
At the authentication phase, a query sample x ∈ X is transformed into t i ∈ T using a transformation function f k i : X → T that depends on the parameter k i ; i.e., t i = f k i (x ) (we use the prime '' '' to represent a symbol associated with query samples). Then the authentication server compares the transformed template t i with the transformed query sample t i . Let s : X × X → R be an ''exact'' score function that takes as input two biometric features and outputs an exact score. The authentication server computes an exact score s(x i , x ) ∈ R between x i and x by comparing t i with t i . Then it verifies a user based on s(x i , x ). The transformation function f k i (resp. f k i ) is designed so that the original template x i (resp. x ) is not recovered from the transformed template t i (resp. t i ).
It should be noted that cancelable biometrics can be divided into salting and non-invertible transformation [11] , [47] . In salting schemes, the transformation function f k i is invertible (e.g., one-to-one function), and therefore the original template x i (or a close approximation of x i ) can be recovered when both t i and k i are leaked. However, the simultaneous leakage of t i and k i can be avoided by managing k i separately from t i ; i.e., data separation [41] .
On the other hand, non-invertible transformation schemes use a many-to-one function as f k i so that, ideally, x i (or its close approximation) cannot be recovered even when both t i and k i are leaked. In practice, however, the many-to-one transformation degrades accuracy, which is a desirable property of an ideal cancelable biometric scheme (see Section II-D.2). Moreover, some studies [48] , [49] showed that x i (or its close approximation) can be recovered from t i and k i even if f k i is a many-to-one function. There is even a theoretical proof that accurate algorithms are unlikely to achieve sufficient non-invertibility when both t i and k i are compromised [50] . In other words, it is very difficult or impossible to design a non-invertible transformation function that satisfies both the accuracy and non-invertibility simultaneously (this issue is also described in [11] , [47] ). Therefore, we focus on salting in this paper.
If we use a public computer (e.g., access control unit, time and attendance unit, kiosk terminal, school computer, ATM) as a client, then any user can access the client. Thus, if we store the parameter k i in the client in this scenario, there 45566 VOLUME 7, 2019 may be a high risk that k i is leaked from the client. Thus, a more secure approach would be to store k i in the parameter management server [46] , which is administrated separately from the authentication server and which cannot be accessed by users. This approach reduces the risk of the leakage of k i by using a kind of secure multi-party protocol, in which the parameter management server does not reveal k i to both the client and the authentication server (see Appendix V for details).
If either t i or k i should be leaked, they could be revoked by generating a new parameter k (new) i ∈ K and reissuing a new transformed template t . The leakage of the original template is strongly prevented by separate management and periodic revocation of t i and k i .
C. CANCELABLE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION
As described in Section I, we focus on a biometric identification system over networks with a public client. Cancelable biometrics can also be applied to such a system.
Regarding the parameters k 1 , · · · , k n ∈ K in cancelable biometric identification, we can consider the following two scenarios: (i) each parameter k i is independently and randomly generated (i.e., the parameter is different from one template to another); (ii) the common parameter k * (= k 1 = · · · = k n ) is used for all templates. The former is referred to as the individual parameter scenario, while the latter as the common parameter scenario [31] . In both scenarios, the parameters k 1 , · · · , k n (or k * ) are stored in the public client or the parameter management server. We note again that the latter is more secure in that the parameter management server (and hence the parameters) cannot be accessed by users (see Appendix V for details).
In the individual parameter scenario, the i-th template x i ∈ X is transformed into t i ∈ T using k i ; i.e.,
. If the parameters k 1 , · · · , k n are stored in the client, then the client transforms a query sample x ∈ X using each of k 1 , · · · , k n at the authentication phase. Let t i = f k i (x ) ∈ T be the i-th transformed query sample. The client sends t 1 , · · · , t n to the authentication server. Then the authentication server computes an exact score s(x i , x ) using t i (= f k i (x i )) and t i (= f k i (x )). In this case, the communication cost between the client and the authentication server is O(n) (since the client needs to send t 1 , · · · , t n ).
In the common parameter scenario, the i-th template x i is transformed into t i using k * ; i.e.,
At the authentication phase, the client only needs to transform a query sample x using k * . Let t = f k * (x ) ∈ T be the transformed query sample. The client sends the transformed query sample t to the authentication server. Then the authentication server computes an exact score s(x i , x ) using t i (= f k * (x i )) and t (= f k * (x )). Since the communication cost does not depend on n (the client sends only t ), the common parameter scenario is preferable in terms of the communication cost. However, we need to discuss the security of this scenario, as the common parameter k * is used for all templates.
In this paper, we thoroughly discuss the security and the communication cost of the proposed indexing scheme in both of the two scenarios.
D. THREAT MODELS AND DESIRABLE PROPERTIES FOR CANCELABLE BIOMETRICS 1) THREAT MODELS
Threat models for template protection schemes are described in ISO/IEC 30136 [41] . In this paper, we assume the standard model [41] as a threat model for cancelable biometric schemes. In the standard model, the attacker has the full knowledge of the algorithms used for template extraction, template protection and comparison, following Kerckhoffs' principles [51] , but knows none of the parameters.
It is possible to consider an even stronger adversarial model: full disclosure model [41] . In the full disclosure model, the attacker has the full knowledge of the algorithms, and also knows the parameters. RUnfortunately, it is very difficult or impossible to provide both the accuracy and irreversibility under this model [11] , [47] - [50] , as described in Section II-B (in fact, it is not described in either ISO/IEC 30136 [41] or ISO/IEC 24745 [45] that cancelable biometrics should be evaluated under the full disclosure model).
Therefore, we propose a cancelable indexing scheme that is secure against the attacker under the standard model. RWe emphasize again that the simultaneous leakage of transformed templates and parameters can be strongly prevented by data separation [41] , and therefore the standard model is highly recognized by the ISO/IEC standard [41] .
2) DESIRABLE PROPERTIES
It is well known that an ideal cancelable biometric scheme should have the following properties [11] , [41] 2 :
1) Irreversibility: It should be impossible or computationally hard to recover the original biometric feature from the transformed feature. 2) Unlinkability: The transformed feature should not allow cross-matching across databases. 3) Revocability: It should be straightforward to revoke a compromised template and reissue a new one based on the same biometric data. 4) Accuracy: FAR (False Acceptance Rate) and FRR (False Rejection Rate) of the biometric system should not be degraded by transforming biometric features. Note that although FAR and FRR are error rates in a biometric verification system, similar accuracy measures are defined for a biometric identification system with n enrollees: FAR(n) and FRR(n) [14] . FAR(n) is a rate of accepting a nonenrollee as one of the n enrollees, whereas FRR(n) is a rate of rejecting an enrollee.
In biometric identification, the ideal cancelable biometric scheme should also have the following property: 5) Response time: The identification time (i.e., oneto-many matching time) should be small (e.g., one second). In this paper, we show that the proposed indexing scheme has these desirable properties. Specifically, we show that the proposed indexing scheme has the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability in our security analysis (Section III-D).
Here we show an information-theoretic property [41] (Theorems 2, 3, and 4), which provides the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability against an attacker having unbounded computational power. We also show that the proposed indexing scheme is very promising with respect to the accuracy and response time in our experiments (Section IV).
E. PERMUTATION-BASED INDEXING
The permutation-based indexing scheme [38] is a state-ofthe-art indexing scheme in the field of similarity search, and has been widely studied in the literature [52] - [60] . We explain this scheme in the case where it is applied to a biometric identification system with n templates
In the permutation-based indexing scheme, we prepare m ∈ N (m n) biometric features o 1 , · · · , o m ∈ X called pivots separately from the templates x 1 , · · · , x n , and store them in the client. The pivots play a key role in generating an index from a biometric feature. Specifically, we generate an index for each template x i using m exact scores
, as described later in detail. There are roughly two approaches to preparing the pivots. One is to collect m biometric features from people other than the enrollees and use them as pivots. The other is to generate m ''artificial'' features for pivots. Since the client can be accessed by any user, there might be a high risk that the pivots are leaked from the client. Thus, the latter approach would be better in terms of security and privacy. In Section III-C, we describe how to generate artificial pivots in detail. Figure 2 shows the overview of the permutationbased indexing scheme. At the enrollment phase, the system computes m exact distances (or similarities)
Then it computes a permutation, where the pivot IDs are written in ascending (or descending) order of the exact distances (or similarities), as an index of x i . Let π i be the permutation of
. The system stores the permutations π 1 , · · · , π n in the database.
At the authentication phase, the system computes a permutation π for a query sample x ∈ X . Then it computes an approximate score between x i and x using the permutations π i and π (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Lets : X × X → R be an approximate score function that takes as input two biometric features and outputs an approximate score. As a measure of the approximate score, we can use a distance measure between two permutations such as Spearman Rho and Spearman Footrule. Since Spearman Rho outperformed Spearman Footrule in [38] , we use Spearman Rho. 
. In this example, the system computes exact scores in order of x 3 , x 4 , x 2 , and x 1 based on Spearman Rhos.
When we use Spearman Rho as a distance measure between two permutations, the approximate scores(x i , x ) between x i and x can be computed as follows:
where ρ i is an inverse permutation of π i , whose j-th element ρ i (j) represents the order of o j in π i . Similarly, ρ is an inverse permutation of π (note that we represent ρ i and ρ as m-dimensional vectors). For example, ρ 1 = (3, 2, 4, 1) and ρ = (3, 1, 2, 4) in Figure 2 , since
in this case. After computing Spearman Rhos for all templates (i.e.,s(x 1 , x ), · · · ,s(x n , x )), it sorts the templates in ascending order of Spearman Rhos. Then it computes an ''exact'' score according to the sorted order. It was shown in [38] that this scheme significantly outperforms other indexing schemes.
III. CANCELABLE PERMUTATION-BASED INDEXING
We propose a cancelable permutation-based indexing scheme for large-scale biometric identification over networks. We first briefly explain its overview (Section III-A). We then describe the proposed algorithm in detail (Section III-B). We also describe how to generate ''artificial'' pivots (Section III-C). We finally analyze the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability of the proposed indexing scheme (Section III-D).
A. OVERVIEW
We begin by explaining the overview of the proposed indexing scheme. The basic idea behind the proposed indexing scheme is that the ordering of templates determined by Spearman Rho in (1) is the same as the ordering of templates determined by the inner product between two inverse permutations. This can be explained as follows. The l 2 norm of the inverse permutation is always the same; i.e.,
. Thus, we have
Moreover, the inverse permutations ρ i and ρ are strongly protected by transforming them via a random matrix and its inverse matrix, respectively (as shown in Sections III-D), and the inner product ρ i · ρ is easily computed by multiplying the transformed inverse permutations (as shown in Section III-B).
Based on these facts, we use the inverse permutation ρ i (resp. ρ ) as an index of x i (resp. x ), and the inner product between two inverse permutations as a measure of the approximate similarity; i.e.,s( Figure 3 shows the overview of the proposed indexing scheme. The proposed indexing scheme generates an index (inverse permutation) using pivots o 1 , · · · , o m , which are stored in the client (we use artificial features as o 1 , · · · , o m , as described in Section III-C in detail). Then it transforms the index in an analogous way to cancelable biometrics.
At the enrollment phase, the system transforms the inverse permutation ρ i ∈ P into u i ∈ U using a transformation function g r i : P → U that depends on a parameter r i ∈ R; i.e.,
The parameter r i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) can be stored in the client or the parameter management server [46] . Below we explain the proposed scheme in the case where the parameters r 1 , · · · , r n are independently generated (i.e., individual parameter scenario) and stored in the client for ease of explanation. In Appendix V, we explain the proposed scheme in the case where the parameters r 1 , · · · , r n are stored in the parameter management server. In this case, the parameters r 1 , · · · , r n in the parameter management server cannot be accessed by users (whereas pivots o 1 , · · · , o m in the client can be accessed by users, and therefore are artificially generated in Section III-C). The proposed scheme explained below can also be applied to the common parameter scenario by setting r * = r 1 = · · · = r n and using r * as a common parameter. At the authentication phase, the system transforms the inverse permutation ρ ∈ P into u i ∈ U using a transformation function g r i : P → U that depends on r i ; i.e., u i = g r i (ρ ). Then it computes an approximate similaritỹ s(x i , x ) = ρ i ·ρ using u i and u i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The system sorts the templates in descending order ofs(x i , x ), and computes an exact score according to the sorted order.
The transformed index u i leaks no information about the original index ρ i and the original template x i (as we prove in Section III-D). Moreover, the ordering determined by the proposed scheme is the same as the ordering determined by the permutation-based indexing scheme. Thus, a genuine template is found at the early stage of exact matching.
B. ALGORITHM
We now describe the proposed indexing scheme in detail. The proposed indexing scheme performs arithmetic operations over the Galois field Z p , where p is a prime larger than m j=1 j 2 . We define the set of parameters for indexes R by a set of non-singular m × m matrices in Z m×m p . We also define g r i (ρ i ) and g r i (ρ ) in Section III-A as follows:
At the enrollment phase, the proposed scheme randomly generates a non-singular m × m matrix r i ∈ R, and uses it as the i-th parameter (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Then the proposed scheme computes the i-th transformed index u i by multiplying the ith index ρ i with the i-th parameter r i . i.e.,
At the authentication phase, the proposed scheme computes the i-th transformed index u i by multiplying the index ρ with (r
We note here that the inner product ρ i · ρ can be computed by multiplying u i with u i over Z p :
Theorem 1: Let u i = g r i (ρ i ) and u i = g r i (ρ ). Then, for any ρ i , ρ ∈ P and r i ∈ R,
The proof is given in Appendix V-B. Based on this property, the proposed scheme computes an approximate similaritys(x i , x ) = ρ i · ρ by multiplying u i with u i over Z p , and sorts the templates in descending order ofs(x i , x ). In summary, the proposed algorithm is as follows: Enrollment:
1) Compute an index (inverse permutation) ρ i for each template x i using pivots
2) Transform ρ i into u i using the parameter r i as follows:
3) Store the transformed indexes u 1 , · · · , u n in the database of the authentication server (along with the transformed templates t 1 , · · · , t n ).
Authentication:
1) Compute an index (inverse permutation) ρ for a query sample x using pivots o 1 , · · · , o m . 2) Transform ρ into u i using the parameter r i as follows:
and compute an exact score according to the sorted order (e.g., if the exact distance falls below a threshold, identify the user as the corresponding enrollee; otherwise, continue to the next template). By Theorem 1, the ordering of templates in the proposed scheme is the same as the ordering of templates sorted by Spearman Rho. Therefore, the proposed indexing scheme can provide the same efficiency as the permutation-based indexing scheme. VOLUME 7, 2019 Note that in the step 1 at the authentication phase, the computation of m exact scores s(o 1 , x ), · · · , s(o m , x ) is necessary to compute the index ρ . However, it requires much less time than computing scores for all templates, since m n (as described in Section II-E).
1) ACCURACY AND RESPONSE TIME
Here we briefly discuss the accuracy and response time in the proposed scheme. When we do not use any indexing scheme, we can identify a user by computing an exact score in a ''pre-determined'' order and iterating the following process: if the exact distance falls below a threshold, identify the user as the corresponding enrollee; otherwise, continue to the next template. In this case, if FAR ×n 1, FAR(n) and FRR(n) can be expressed as: FAR(n) ≈ n× FAR and FRR(n) ≈ FRR [14] . The average number of exact score computations is n/2 (since a genuine template is found after computing on average n/2 scores).
When we use the proposed indexing scheme, we identify a user by computing an exact score in the ''sorted'' order. For example, we can identify a user by computing exact scores until we find a template whose exact distance falls below a threshold (as explained above). In this case, FAR(n) and FRR(n) are not degraded by the proposed scheme (i.e., if FAR ×n 1, FAR(n) ≈ n× FAR and FRR(n) ≈ FRR), since nothing is changed except for the order of templates.
In Section IV, we show that the proposed scheme significantly reduces the average number of exact score computations (and hence the average identification time) while keeping FAR(n) and FRR(n) as above.
2) STORAGE REQUIREMENT
The size of each transformed index u i ∈ Z m p stored in the authentication server is very small; when each element of u i is represented as an unsigned integer, the size of u i is 4m bytes. The size of the transformed index u i at the authentication phase is also 4m bytes. The size of each parameter r i ∈ Z m×m p is 4m 2 bytes. For example, when m = 100 (as in our experiments), the size of u i , u i and r i is 400 bytes, 400 bytes, and 40 kilobytes, respectively.
C. GENERATION OF ARTIFICIAL PIVOTS
Here we describe how to prepare m pivots o 1 , · · · , o m in the proposed indexing scheme. As described in Section II-E, there might be a high risk that the pivots o 1 , · · · , o m are leaked from the client (note that the parameters r 1 , · · · , r n can be revoked even if they are leaked, as described in Section II-B; they can also be stored in the parameter management server [46] to strongly prevent the leakage of them, as described in Appendix V). Thus, it would be better to generate m artificial features for pivots.
We describe how to generate artificial pivots by taking as example the case in which a biometric feature is represented as a d-dimensional vector; i.e., X = R d . The simplest approach to generating artificial pivots is to generate pivots o 1 , · · · , o m uniformly at random from R d . However, this approach is not promising in terms of efficiency (i.e., response time), because biometric features are generally non-uniform. This can be easily explained using an example shown in Figure 4 (d = 2). In this example, artificial pivots are generated uniformly at random, whereas biometric features are non-uniform. Consequently, most of the permutations are the same, which makes the permutationbased indexing useless. This simple example indicates that we should generate artificial pivots (not from R d but) from a distribution of biometric features.
Taking this into account, we propose a method to generate artificial pivots based on GANs (Generative Adversarial Networks) [39] , a state-of-the-art generative model. GANs are composed of a generator G that mimics the true data distribution and a discriminator D that distinguishes between samples from the true data distribution and samples generated by G. Here we do not explain the details of GANs (see [39] for details), but explain how to generate artificial pivots using GANs. Figure 5 shows the overview of generating artificial pivots using GANs. We first train a generator G using templates or any other biometric features collected in advance. A recent study [61] showed that the attacker can infer information about the training data by accessing to the generator G. Specifically, it showed that the attacker can infer whether a specific sample was used to train G (i.e., membership inference) with high accuracy by making queries to G (i.e., black-box access). However, when G is not available (we discard G as described above), it is very hard for the attacker to infer information about the training data from the generated samples (i.e,. o 1 , · · · , o m ). In fact, it was reported in [61] that the attack using only the generated samples from DCGANs (Deep Convolutional GANs) [40] performs almost the same as a random guess.
In our experiments, we generated pivots o 1 , · · · , o m using DCGANs. We also confirmed that a distribution of exact scores between the pivots and training features is very close to an impostor score distribution, which means that a pivot looks like a different person's feature.
1) REMARK
It should be noted that although the proposed method randomly samples m pivots from a generator G, a better pivot sampling method might exist. For example, Amato et al. [62] compared several pivot selection methods for the permutation-based indexing using Spearman Rho. Their results showed that although a method to randomly select pivots from the database is not bad, it is outperformed, in terms of efficiency, by the farthest-first traversal (FFT) [63] , which selects data that maximizes the distance from the closest pivot in each iteration. Therefore, the proposed method might also be improved by sampling m ( m) data from a generator G and then selecting m pivots from m data using the FFT. We leave such improvement as future work.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now analyze the security properties of the proposed indexing scheme. We first separate the security of transformed indexes from the security of transformed biometric features, and show that the proposed indexing scheme has the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability under the standard model [41] (as described in Section II-D). Then we discuss the total security against attackers who have transformed biometric features in addition to transformed indexes.
1) IRREVERSIBILITY
We begin with the irreversibility of the proposed scheme. Here we consider attackers of the following three types:
Attacker A who obtains the i-th transformed index u i in the database of the authentication server.
Attacker B who obtains all the transformed indexes u 1 , · · · , u n in the database of the authentication server.
Attacker C who obtains u 1 , · · · , u n and all the transformed indexes u 1 , · · · , u n at the authentication phase.
Attackers A and B are typically external attackers who obtain the transformed data leaked from the authentication server. On the other hand, Attacker C is an internal attacker (i.e., malicious server administrator) who can access the transformed data at the authentication phase, in addition to the transformed data enrolled in the database.
We first prove that the proposed indexing scheme has the perfect secrecy property against Attacker A:
Theorem 2 (Perfect secrecy): For any ρ i ∈ P, x i ∈ X , and u i ∈ U,
The proof is given in Appendix V-B. This theorem means that the i-th transformed index u i provides no information about the original index ρ i and the original template x i . In other words, the proposed scheme has perfect secrecy against Attacker A (in both the individual parameter scenario and the common parameter scenario).
It should be noted that Theorem 2 holds irrespective of the values of m and p. As described in Section III-B, the proposed scheme performs arithmetic operations over Z p , where p is a prime larger than m j=1 j 2 
It should also be noted that if the attacker obtains both the transformed index u i and parameter r i , then she can recover the original index ρ i . We emphasize again that the original index can be recovered from the transformed index and parameter, even if the many-to-one transformation function is used [48] , [49] . Thus we evaluate the security of the proposed scheme under the standard model in ISO/IEC 30136 [41] . The simultaneous leakage of u i and r i is strongly prevented by data separation [41] ; i.e., separately storing u i and r i .
We then consider the irreversibility of the proposed scheme against Attackers B and C in the individual parameter scenario. In this scenario, the i-th index x i is independent of the j-th transformed index u j (i = j), since the parameter r i is independent of r j (i = j). Thus, the proposed scheme has perfect secrecy against Attacker B in this scenario.
The information available to Attacker C in the individual parameter scenario is the following system of equations:
This is equivalent to the following system of equations:
(we can obtain (11) by multiplying (8) with (9) over Z p ). By Theorem 2, u i in (10) provides no information about ρ i . By Theorem 1, u i · u i mod p in (11) is equal to the approximate similaritys(x i , x ). Therefore, the only information available to the attacker is the approximate similaritys(x i , x ), which is necessary to perform a query search. Assume that the attacker attempts to recover ρ i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and ρ from u i · u i mod p (1 ≤ i ≤ n) by solving (11) . (11) is a system of quadratic simultaneous equations with m(n + 1) unknown variables and n equations. Thus, the number of unknown variables is about m times larger than the number of equations. For example, we set m to be 50 or more in our experiments in Section IV. In this case, the number of unknown variables is more than 50 times the number of equations. Consequently, it is very hard for the attacker to recover ρ i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and ρ .
We finally consider Attackers B and C in the common parameter scenario. In this scenario, r * = r 1 = · · · = r n and u 1 = · · · = u n . Then (8) and (9) are quadratic simultaneous equations with m(n+1)+m 2 unknown variables (i.e., ρ 1 , · · · , ρ n , ρ , r * ) and m(n + 1) equations. Thus, the number of unknown variables is larger than the number of equations in (8) and (9), and the difference m 2 increases quadratically in m (the same applies to (10) and (11)). For example, when m = 50 or more (as in our experiments), the number of unknown variables is larger than the number of equations by 2500 or more. Consequently, it is hard for Attacker C to recover ρ i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and ρ . It is harder for Attacker B to recover them, because u i in (9) is not available to this attacker. Table 3 summarizes the irreversibility of the proposed scheme. As described in Section II-C, there is a trade-off between the security and the communication cost. In the individual parameter scenario, we need to send n transformed indexes u 1 , · · · , u n at the authentication phase. When each of u 1 , · · · , u n is represented as a vector of unsigned integers, the total size is 4mn bytes. In the common parameter scenario, we need to send only one transformed index, since u 1 = · · · = u n . In this case, the total size is 4m bytes.
For example, when n = 10000 and m = 100, the total size is 4 megabytes (resp. 400 bytes) in the individual parameter scenario (resp. the common parameter scenario). If we can use a high-speed (e.g., 10 or 100 Gbps) Ethernet private line, the communication cost does not matter in the individual parameter scenario. In this case, we should use the proposed scheme with the individual parameters, since it has perfect secrecy against Attacker B. If such a high-speed network environment is not available, we should use the proposed scheme with the common parameter.
2) UNLINKABILITY
Next we analyze the unlinkability of the proposed scheme. Assume that two authentication servers A and B have databases DB (A) and DB (B) , respectively. The i-th user transforms the same index ρ i into u are independently and randomly generated from R, then for any ρ i ∈ P,
The proof is given in Appendix V-B. We also note that are statistically independent and they have no correlation. Therefore, the proposed scheme strongly prevents the cross-matching attack and achieves unlinkability.
3) REVOCABILITY
Assume that the transformed index u i is leaked from the authentication server, or the parameter r i is leaked from the parameter management server (or client). In this case, we can revoke them by generating a new parameter r Assume that the communication channel between the parameter management server (or client) and the authentication server is encrypted (e.g., by AES). Then we can reissue r 
and sends it to the authentication server. 2) The authentication server computes a new transformed index u 
Since then, the parameter management server (or client) uses a new parameter r . Consequently, she also cannot obtain any information about ρ i . Therefore, our revocation process is secure against the external attacker.
Second, we analyze the security against the authentication server, since it newly receives the delta parameter r i in our revocation process. That is, a malicious administrator of the authentication server might attempt to obtain information about r 
The proof is given in Appendix V-B. We note again that Theorem 4 holds irrespective of the values of m and p in the same way as Theorem 2.
Theorem 4 means that r i provides no information about r (new) i
. Then by (6) in Theorem 2, the malicious administrator also cannot obtain any information about ρ i from r i and u
. Therefore, the revocation process explained above is secure against the malicious administrator of the authentication server.
4) TOTAL SECURITY
We have so far separated the security of transformed indexes from the security of transformed biometric features, and shown that the proposed indexing scheme has the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability. We can also achieve the total security against attackers who have both transformed biometric features and transformed indexes by using as an exact matcher the cancelable biometric scheme that has the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability.
For example, CIRF [3] - [5] has the same security properties as in Sections III-D.1, III-D.2, and III-D.3 (for details of the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability of CIRF, see [3] - [5] ). Therefore, we can achieve all of the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability against attackers who have both transformed biometric features and transformed indexes by using the proposed scheme in conjunction with CIRF.
In Section IV-B, we use the proposed indexing scheme in conjunction with CIRF and show that it provides high accuracy and fast response time along with the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We conducted experiments to evaluate the proposed indexing scheme. In our experiments, we used three real datasets: the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset [42] , CASIAFingerprintV5 dataset [43] , and finger-vein dataset in [44] . We used these datasets because they are one of the largest face, fingerprint, and finger-vein datasets, respectively; e.g., they include more subjects than other well-known face [64] , [65] , fingerprint [66] - [68] , and finger-vein [69] - [71] datasets, respectively.
It should be noted that a cancelable biometric scheme is not used (i.e., plain matcher is used) as an exact matcher in the NIST BSSR1 Set3 and CASIA-FingerprintV5 datasets (as described later in detail). However, it is still important to use these datasets, because we would like to show the efficiency of the proposed indexing scheme for various biometric traits. Using these datasets, we show that the proposed indexing scheme outperforms other indexing schemes in terms of the number of exact score computations.
On the other hand, we use CIRF [3] - [5] (a cancelable biometric scheme that has the perfect secrecy property in the same way as the proposed scheme, as described in Section I) as an exact matcher in the finger-vein dataset in [44] . Using this dataset, we conduct a deeper analysis. More specifically, we show the efficiency of the proposed indexing scheme in terms of both the number of exact score computations and the cancelable biometric identification time. We also show the effectiveness of the proposed method to generate artificial pivots based on GANs (described in Section III-C).
We first report the experimental results using the face and fingerprint datasets (Section IV-A). We then report the results using the finger-vein dataset (Section IV-B).
A. EVALUATION USING THE FACE AND FINGERPRINT DATASETS 1) EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
We first evaluated the proposed indexing scheme using the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset [42] and CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset [43] . Below we describe these datasets in detail.
NIST BSSR1 SET3 DATASET [42] This dataset contains face scores (similarities) from 3000 subjects. Each subject contributed one template and two query samples, and face scores were generated by comparing query samples with templates using two commercial (plain) face matcher (''C'' and ''G''). In our experiments, we used scores from the matcher ''G'', since some subjects had inappropriate scores (whose values were -1) in the matcher ''C''. Note that we used two 3000 × 3000 score matrices, each of which corresponds to the first and second query samples, respectively.
We randomly selected 2900 out of 3000 subjects, and regarded them as enrollees (n = 2900). Then we randomly selected m = 50 or 100 pivots from the templates of the remaining 100 subjects. VOLUME 7, 2019 CASIA-FingerprintV5 DATASET [43] This dataset contains fingerprint images from eight fingers (thumb, index, middle, and ring fingers from both hands) of 500 subjects. Each subject contributed five samples per finger. To further increase the number of subjects, we assumed that each finger was presented a different subject (4000 subjects in total). We used the first two samples for each subject, and regarded the first and second samples as a template and query sample, respectively. Then we computed scores (similarities) among all of the samples using the VeriFinger SDK 7.0 [72] , a state-of-the-art commercial (plain) fingerprint matcher. There were two 4000 × 4000 score matrices in total.
We randomly selected 3600 out of 4000 subjects, and regarded them as enrollees (n = 3600). Then we randomly selected m = 200 or 400 pivots from the templates of the remaining 400 subjects.
In both the datasets, we used the first and second score matrices to compute indexes for templates and query samples, respectively. As an indexing scheme, we compared the proposed indexing scheme (denoted by Proposal * ; the asterisk '' * '' represents that the scheme has the perfect secrecy property) with the following two schemes: the standard pivotbased indexing scheme [38] (denoted by Pivot) and the distance-based hashing scheme [73] (denoted by DBH).
Pivot [38] is a widely used indexing scheme, and its algorithm is similar to the permutation-based one. It computes, for each template x i , the m-dimensional vector (s(o 1 , x i ), · · · , s(o m , x i )) comprising scores for m pivots o 1 , · · · , o m , and uses it as an index. Then it computes a distance (e.g., L ∞ distance [38] , L 2 distance [74] ) between the template's vector and the query sample's vector as an approximate score. This indexing scheme was also applied to multimodal biometrics in [74] . In our experiments, we used the L ∞ distance between the score vectors as a measure of the approximate score in the same way as [38] .
DBH [73] is a variant of LSH (Locality Sensitive Hashing) that can be applied to arbitrary exact matchers (including the face and fingerprint matchers in our experiments).
We evaluate this scheme, because one of the most popular biometric indexing schemes is based on LSH [19] - [22] , [27] , [37] . We set parameters in DBH in the same way as [31] . Note that both Pivot and DBH do not protect an index unlike Proposal * . Nonetheless, we evaluate these schemes to show how efficient Proposal * is, compared to other schemes.
For each dataset, we conducted an experiment, where each of the n enrollees presents her query sample and the system identifies the enrollee. For each indexing scheme, we fixed the number of exact score computations n and evaluated a hit rate, the percentage of the case where a genuine template is included in the n templates.
2) EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We first evaluated FAR and FRR of the exact matcher using the second score matrix (i.e., 3000 × 3000 scores in the NIST BSSR1 SET3, 4000 × 4000 scores in the CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset). Figure 6 shows the DET (Detection Error Tradeoff) curve [75] , which is obtained by plotting FAR against FRR at various thresholds. For example, when FRR was 0.1, FAR was 2.2 × 10 −2 (resp. 2.7 × 10 −6 ) in the NIST BSSR1 Set3 (resp. CASIA-FingerprintV5) dataset. EER (Equal Error Rate; the operating point where FAR=FRR) was 6.5 × 10 −2 (resp. 4.5 × 10 −2 ) in the NIST BSSR1 Set3 (resp. CASIA-FingerprintV5) dataset. 3 We then evaluated the performance of the indexing schemes. Figures 7 and 8 show the relationship between the hit rate and the number of exact score computations n (note that both Proposal * and Pivot require the computation of exact scores for m pivots to compute an index for a query sample). We also show in Tables 4 and 5 the fraction of exact score computations (i.e., n /n) necessary to achieve the hit rate of 90%, 95%, 98%, and 99%, and the average fraction of exact score computations (denoted by ''AVG'') necessary to find a genuine template. Note that ''AVG'' represents how much the average number of exact score computations can be reduced without degrading FAR(n) and FRR(n), as described in Section III-B (if we do not use any indexing scheme, then AVG is 50%).
It can be seen from Figures 7 and 8 and Tables 4 and 5 that Proposal * outperforms both Pivot and DBH in both the datasets. It can also be seen by comparing Figure 7 with Figure 8 that all of the three indexing schemes provide worse performance in the CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset. We consider this is because the fingerprint matcher output a nonnegative integer as a score (similarity) and many impostor scores were 0. In other words, score-based indexes did not contain much discriminative information in this dataset.
It can be seen from Tables 4 and 5 that in Proposal * , the number of exact score computations required to achieve the hit rate of 90%, 95%, 98%, or 99% is reduced by increasing the number of pivots m. This is because the amount of information in the indexes ρ 1 , · · · , ρ n and ρ increases with increase in m. However, the average fraction of exact score computations ''AVG'' decreases with decrease in m. This is because a genuine template was found right after computing m + 1 scores in many cases. For example, Proposal * (m = 50) reduces the average number of exact score computations from 50% to 4.83% (about one tenth) in the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset without degrading FAR(n) and FRR(n).
In summary, Proposal * outperforms Pivot and DBH in terms of efficiency, besides the fact that Proposal * has the perfect secrecy property (as shown in Section III-D).
B. EVALUATION USING THE FINGER-VEIN DATASET 1) EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
We then evaluated the proposed indexing scheme using the finger-vein dataset in [44] . Below we describe this dataset.
FINGER-VEIN DATASET IN [44]
This dataset contains finger-vein images from six fingers (index, middle, and ring fingers from both hands) of 505 subjects. To further increase the number of subjects, we assumed that each finger was presented by a different subject (3030 subjects in total). For each finger, we used two images (one for enrollment and the other for authentication). We eliminated 32 subjects whose images are not appropriately captured. We extracted a finger-vein feature from each image using the feature extraction method in [76] . Then we transformed the feature into a 32 × 64 binary image, where each pixel takes 1 (vein) or 0 (background). As an exact matcher, we used CIRF [3] - [5] described in Section I. We set parameters in CIRF in the same way as [31] (see [31] for details), and computes scores (distances) among all of the features. There were two 2998 × 2998 score matrices in total.
TABLE 4.
Fraction of exact score computations (i.e., n /n) (%) necessary to achieve the hit rate of 90%, 95%, 98%, and 99%, and the average fraction of exact score computations (denoted by ''AVG'') (%) necessary to find a genuine template in the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset (Pro * : Proposal * , Piv: Pivot; the subscript digit represents the number of pivots m). The best performance is highlighted in boldface. Note that n /n exceeds 100% for Pivot in some cases, since it needs to compute scores for m pivots (m ≤ n ≤ n + m).
TABLE 5.
Fraction of exact score computations (i.e., n /n) (%) necessary to achieve the hit rate of 90%, 95%, 98%, and 99%, and the average fraction of exact score computations (denoted by ''AVG'') (%) necessary to find a genuine template in the CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset (Pro * : Proposal * , Piv: Pivot; the subscript digit represents the number of pivots m). The best performance is highlighted in boldface. Note that n /n exceeds 100% for Pivot in some cases, since it needs to compute scores for m pivots (m ≤ n ≤ n + m).
We randomly selected 2898 out of 2998 subjects, and regarded them as enrollees (n = 2898). Then we randomly selected m = 50 or 100 pivots from the templates of the remaining 100 subjects.
As with Section IV-A, we used the first and second score matrices to compute indexes for templates and query samples, respectively. As an indexing scheme, we compared Proposal * with Pivot [38] , DBH [73] , and the cancelable indexing scheme based on matrix factorization for fingervein images [31] (denoted by MF * ) described in Section I. In Proposal * , we set the prime p to be p = 338369 (> 100 i=1 i 2 ). In MF * , we used BMF (Boolean Matrix Factorization) [77] as a factorization method, and set the rank k to be k = 2 (since it provided the best performance in [31] ). Note that Pivot and DBH do not protect an index, whereas Proposal * and MF * have the perfect secrecy property.
In this dataset, we also evaluated Proposal * in the case where artificial pivots are generated. Here we attempted three methods to generate artificial pivots. The first one is to generate artificial pivots uniformly at random (i.e., generate 1 or 0 with equal probability for each pixel). The second one is to assume that each pixel of a finger-vein image is independently generated from the Bernoulli distribution. Specifically, we train a parameter q of the Bernoulli distribution for each pixel independently by using the templates of 2998 subjects as training features. Then we generate artificial pivots by independently generating 1 (resp. 0) with probability q (resp. 1 − q) for each pixel. The third one is to generate artificial pivots based on DCGANs (as described in Section III-C). VOLUME 7, 2019 TABLE 6. Fraction of exact score computations (i.e., n /n) (%) to achieve the hit rate of 90%, 95%, 98%, and 99%, and the average fraction of exact score computations (denoted by ''AVG'') (%) necessary to find a genuine template in the finger-vein dataset (Pro * : Proposal * , Pro * D : Proposal * DCGAN , Pro * B : Proposal * Bernoulli , Pro * r : Proposal * rand , Piv: Pivot; the subscript digit represents the number of pivots m). The best performance is highlighted in boldface.
FIGURE 9. DET curve (FAR-FRR curve) in finger-vein dataset.
Here we used KERAS-DCGAN [78] as an implementation of DCGANs, and the templates of 2998 subjects as training features. We denote these three methods by Proposal * rand , Proposal * Bernoulli , and Proposal * DCGAN , respectively. We conducted an experiment, where each of the 2898 enrollees presents her query sample and the system identifies the enrollee. Then we evaluated the relationship between the hit rate and the number of exact score computations n .
2) EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We first evaluated FAR and FRR of the exact matcher using the second score matrix (i.e., 2998 × 2998 scores). Figure 9 shows the DET curve. For example, when FRR was 0.02 (resp. 0.01), FAR was 3.3 × 10 −7 (resp. 2.6 × 10 −6 ). EER was 1.0 × 10 −3 .
We then evaluated the performance of the indexing schemes. Figure 10 and Table 6 show the results. It can be seen that Proposal * significantly outperforms MF * , and that Proposal * provides the best performance. For example, MF * requires the exact score computation for 57.6% of the templates to achieve a hit rate of 95%. On the other hand, Proposal * (m = 100) requires only 4.0%.
It can also be seen by comparing Figures 7 and 8 with Figure 10 that Proposal * provides the best performance in the finger-vein dataset. This is because the accuracy of the exact matcher is the highest in this dataset. In other words, scores (and hence score-based indexes) had the most discriminative information in this dataset. This result indicates that the proposed indexing scheme is effective especially when we use a highly accurate exact matcher. It can be seen from Figure 10 that Proposal * rand performs much worse than Proposal * . This is because a distribution of biometric features is non-uniform, as described in Section III-C. It can also be seen that Proposal * Bernoulli performs almost the same as Proposal * rand . We consider this is because there is a very high correlation between neighbor pixels in a finger vein image (note that finger-vein is connected across pixels). In other words, the assumption of independence for each pixel is not appropriate, and consequently a distribution of generated pivots is far from that of biometric features. On the other hand, Proposal * DCGAN provides the performance close to Proposal * , which indicates that DCGANs successfully approximate a distribution of biometric features.
We finally examined the one-to-many matching time in Proposal * DCGAN . Specifically, it was reported in [31] that CIRF requires 0.28 ms to compute one exact score on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620 v3 (2.40 GHz, 6cores) with 32 GB RAM. We also confirmed that the time to compute one approximate score is negligibly small compared to 0.28 ms. For example, when the number of templates is n = 70000, it takes about 20 (≈ 0.28 × 10 −3 × 70000) seconds to compute exact scores for all of the templates. MF * still requires about 11.3 (≈ 0.28 × 10 −3 × 70000 × 0.576 by Table 6 ) seconds to find a genuine template with 95%. On the other hand, Proposal * DCGAN (m = 100) can reduce the identification time to about 0.84 (≈ 0.28 × 10 −3 × 70000 × 0.043) seconds with probability 95%.
In addition, recall that ''AVG'' represents how much the average number of exact score computations (and hence the average one-to-many matching time) can be reduced without degrading FAR(n) and FRR(n). For example, if we do not use an indexing scheme and an identification threshold is set so that FRR = 0.02 and FAR = 3.3 × 10 −7 , then FAR(n) ≈ 70000 × 3.3 × 10 −7 = 0.023, FRR(n) ≈ 0.02 (as described in Section III-B), and the average identification time is about 9.8 (≈ 0.28 × 10 −3 × 70000 × 0.5) seconds. By using an indexing scheme, we can reduce the average identification time while keeping FAR(n) and FRR(n) to be FAR(n) ≈ 0.023 and FRR(n) ≈ 0. × 70000 × 0.0321) seconds. We also note that multibiometrics [79] can be used to provide much smaller FAR(n) and FRR(n).
From these results, we conclude that the proposed indexing scheme is very promising with respect to the accuracy and response time.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a cancelable permutation-based indexing scheme for secure and efficient biometric identification over networks. We proved that the proposed scheme has perfect secrecy, and comprehensively showed that it has the irreversibility, unlinkability, and revocability. We also demonstrated that the proposed scheme outperforms the existing schemes (Pivot, DBH, and MF * ) in all of the face, fingerprint, and finger-vein datasets, and is very promising with respect to the accuracy and response time.
As described in Section I, secure and efficient cancelable indexing is an open problem in a large-scale biometric identification system over networks. We believe our work takes an important step toward achieving the goal.
APPENDIX A PARAMETER MANAGEMENT SERVER A. CANCELABLE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION USING THE PARAMETER MANAGEMENT SERVER
The parameter management server model was proposed in [46] . Although it was originally proposed for biometric verification, it can be easily extended to biometric identification. Below we explain a cancelable biometric identification protocol using the parameter management server in the individual parameter scenario where the parameters k 1 , · · · , k n are independently generated (the protocol can be applied to biometric verification by setting n = 1). Figure 11 shows the overview of the cancelable biometric identification protocol using the parameter management server (here we explain one of the three protocols proposed in [46] ). In this protocol, we assume that the transformation function f k satisfies the following condition:
Condition 1: There exists a function φ : K × K → K (K: space of parameters) and a function ψ l : T → T (T : space of transformed features) depending on a parameter l ∈ K such that for any k, l ∈ K and any x ∈ X (X : space of original features), we have
In addition, for any k ∈ K and any z ∈ K, there is exactly one parameter l ∈ K such that φ(k, l) = z. For example, the transformation functions in [2] - [8] satisfy this condition.
We also assume that the parameter management server and the authentication server are administered separately, and that they do not collude with each other. In addition, we assume that the communication channel between each pair of entities (i.e., client, parameter management server, authentication server) is independently encrypted (e.g., by AES). Thus, one entity (e.g., authentication server) cannot eavesdrop the communication between the other entities (e.g., client and parameter management server).
Then, the cancelable biometric identification protocol using the parameter management server is written as follows:
1) The parameter management server randomly generates l i ∈ K and computes a ''one-time'' parameter φ(
to the client and l 1 , · · · , l n to the authentication server. 2) The client transforms a query sample
to the authentication server.
3) The authentication server re-transforms t i into a ''onetime'' template ψ l i (t i ) using
, and identifies the user.
Note that the one-time parameter φ(k i , l i ) and the onetime template ψ l i (t i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are valid during only one authentication session (they are discarded after the session). The parameter management server does not reveal the original parameters k 1 , · · · , k n to both the client and the authentication server. The only information available to the client is the one-time parameters φ(k 1 , l 1 ), · · · , φ(k n , l n ), and the client cannot recover the original parameters k 1 , · · · , k n from φ(k 1 , l 1 ), · · · , φ(k n , l n ) (by Condition 1). Similarly, the only information available to the authentication server is l 1 , · · · , l n , and the authentication server cannot recover k 1 , · · · , k n from l 1 , · · · , l n . Thus, the original parameters k 1 , · · · ,k n cannot be leaked from the parameter management server. Moreover, k 1 , · · · , k n cannot be accessed by users, since the parameter management server cannot be accessed by them. Consequently, both parameters k 1 , · · · , k n and transformed templates t 1 , · · · , t n are strongly protected.
Although we explained the cancelable biometric identification protocol in the individual parameter scenario, it can also be applied to the common parameter scenario by setting k * = k 1 = · · · = k n and l * = l 1 = · · · = l n , and using k * and l * as common parameters.
B. CANCELABLE PERMUTATION-BASED INDEXING USING THE PARAMETER MANAGEMENT SERVER
In Section III, we describe the proposed indexing scheme in the case where the parameters r 1 , · · · , r n are stored in the client. Below we explain the proposed indexing scheme in the case where the parameters r 1 , · · · , r n are stored in the parameter management server. Figure 12 shows the overview of the proposed indexing scheme using the parameter management server. We first explain that the transformation function g r (recall that r ∈ R where R is the space of parameters for indexes) in the proposed indexing scheme satisfies the following condition:
Condition 2: There exists a function φ : R × R → R (R: space of parameters for indexes) and a function ψ w : U → U (U: space of transformed indexes) depending on a parameter w ∈ R such that for any r, w ∈ R and any ρ ∈ P (P: space of original indexes), we have
In addition, for any r ∈ R and any z ∈ R, there is exactly one parameter w ∈ R such that φ(r, w) = z. Let φ(r, w) = rw and ψ w (u) = uw in the proposed indexing scheme. Then, (17) holds because g φ(r,w) (ρ) = ρφ(r, w) = ρ(rw) = (ρr)w = g r (ρ)w = ψ w (g r (ρ)). Thus, the transformation function g r satisfies Condition 2.
We also assume that the parameter management server and the authentication server are administered separately. In addition, we assume that the communication channel between each pair of entities (i.e., client, parameter management server, authentication server) is independently encrypted (e.g., by AES).
Then the proposed indexing scheme using the parameter management sever is written as follows:
1) The parameter management server randomly generates w i ∈ R and computes a ''one-time'' parameter φ(r i , w i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Then it sends φ(r 1 , w 1 ), · · · , φ(r n , w n ) to the client and w 1 , · · · , w n to the authentication server. 2) The client computes an index (inverse permutation) ρ for a query sample x using pivots o 1 , · · · , o m . 3) The client transforms ρ into g φ(r i ,w i ) (ρ ) using φ(r i , w i )
(1 ≤ i ≤ n). Then it sends g φ(r 1 ,w 1 ) (ρ ), · · · , g φ(r n ,w n ) (ρ ) to the authentication server. 4) The authentication server re-transforms u i into a ''onetime'' template ψ w i (u i ) using FIGURE 12 . Overview of the proposed indexing scheme using the parameter management server.
prove this in the same way as Theorem 1). Therefore, we use the result value as an approximate similaritỹ s(x i , x ). 6) The authentication server sorts the templates in descending order of the approximate similarities s(x 1 , x ), · · · ,s(x n , x ), and computes an exact score according to the sorted order. The one-time parameter φ(r i , w i ) and the one-time template ψ w i (u i ) are valid during only one authentication session. As with the cancelable identification protocol (described in Appendix V-A), both the client and authentication server cannot obtain the original parameters r 1 , · · · , r n . In addition, the parameter management server (and hence r 1 , · · · , r n ) cannot be accessed by users. Therefore, both parameters r 1 , · · · , r n and transformed templates u 1 , · · · , u n are strongly protected.
The proposed scheme explained above can also be applied to the common parameter scenario by setting r * = r 1 = · · · = r n and w * = w 1 = · · · = w n , and using r * and w * as common parameters.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The right side of (3) can be expressed as follows:
Since
and p is a prime larger than m j=1 j 2 (as described in Section III-B), ρ i · ρ can be written as follows:
By (18) and (19) , the equation (3) holds.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first prove that the equation (6) holds. Recall that indexes are represented as m-dimensional vectors over Z p , and that parameters are m × m non-singular matrices over Z p . P, R, and U are the space of original indexes, parameters, and transformed indexes, respectively. Given ρ ∈ P and u ∈ U, let λ ρ,u be a set of parameters r ∈ R satisfying u = ρr mod p (i.e., λ ρ,u = {r|u = ρr mod p}). Consider two indexes ρ, ρ ∈ P. Since they are permutations of the set {1, · · · , m}, there exists a permutation matrix π ∈ {0, 1} m×m such that ρ = ρπ . Then, u = ρr mod p = ρππ −1 r mod p = ρ (π r) mod p (20) (by π −1 = π ), and therefore π λ ρ,u ⊆ λ ρ ,u . Let α : λ ρ,u → λ ρ ,u be a function such that α(r) = π r. Below we show that α is injective. Suppose that there exist two different parameters r, r ∈ λ ρ,u (r = r ) such that π r = π r . Then we have π (r − r ) = 0 ⇐⇒ r = r (since π is non-singular), which contradicts the fact that r = r . Thus, π r = π r holds for any r, r ∈ λ ρ,u (r = r ), which means that α is injective.
Therefore, we have |λ ρ,u | = |π λ ρ,u | ≤ |λ ρ ,u |. By symmetry, we also have |λ ρ ,u | ≤ |λ ρ,u |, and consequently we have |λ ρ,u | = |λ ρ ,u |
(i.e., #{r|u = ρr mod p} = #{r|u = ρ r mod p}). Then, since r is randomly generated from R, Pr(u|ρ) = Pr(u|ρ ) holds for any u ∈ U and any ρ, ρ ∈ P. The equation (6) 
The equation (7) is derived from (6) , since x i , ρ i , and u i form a Markov chain (i.e., x i → ρ i → u i ).
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Pr(u 
Recall that in Appendix V-B, we defined λ ρ,u by a set of parameters r ∈ R satisfying u = ρr mod p (i.e., λ ρ,u = {r|u = ρr mod p}). Since r 
Note that |λ ρ,u | = |λ ρ ,u | for any ρ, ρ ∈ P and any u ∈ U (by (21) ). Then by (23)- (28) 
By (29) , (30) , and (31), the left side of (12) can be written as follows:
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Since both r i and r 
In other words, for any r (new) i ∈ R and any r i ∈ R, there is exactly one parameter r i ∈ R such that r i = β(r i ). Thus, β is surjective, and hence bijective.
Therefore, if r i and r 
Therefore, (15) holds. 
